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1. Introduction 
Since Keynes (1936) compared investor behavior in stock markets to a beauty contest, the ques-
tion has been asked whether extrinsic information, such as animal spirits or sunspots may affect 
agents’ behavior. Starting with Azariadis (1981), Cass and Shell (1983), and Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) a rich theoretical literature has explored the influence of animal spirits or sun-
spots on economic activities.1 In settings with multiple equilibria, agents may condition their 
actions on publicly observable but intrinsically uninformative signals (sunspots). Consequently, 
such signals may serve as focal points for agents’ beliefs, and these beliefs may become self-
fulfilling giving rise to sunspot equilibria. This literature introduced a fruitful approach to model 
aggregate fluctuations and shifts in sentiments that are often hard to rationalize because they 
frequently occur without apparent changes in economic fundamentals.  
Equilibrium multiplicity arises in many macroeconomic models as they often entail stra-
tegic complementarities arising from technology externalities, market imperfections, search 
frictions or incomplete information (see e.g., Cooper and John, 1988)2. As a consequence, these 
frictions can, for example, introduce sunspot equilibria into business cycle models (e.g., Chris-
tiano and Harrison, 1999, Jaimovich, 2007, or Benhabib and Wang, 2013). Similarly, strategic 
complementarities play a key role in models of bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), spec-
ulative attacks (Obstfeld, 1996, Morris and Shin, 1998), and other crises phenomena that have 
                                                     
1 Keynes used the term “animal spirits” to explain fluctuations in investor behavior, whereas the term sunspot 
originated in the work of William Jevons (1884), who proposed a relationship between sun activity (i.e., the num-
ber of sunspots) and the business cycle. In the theoretical literature, the term “sunspot” is a synonym for extrinsic 
random variables, i.e., variables that may influence economic behavior, but are unrelated to fundamentals such as 
payoffs, preferences, technologies, or endowments. For a modern account of a possible relationship between busi-
ness-cycle fluctuations and sunspots see Farmer (1999).  
2 In monetary macro models, equilibrium multiplicity may also arise from price-level indeterminacy, as transver-
sality conditions in DSGE models are often not fundamentally justified (Cochrane, 2011). 
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been associated with coordination failure. While in all of these environments, sunspots can the-
oretically cause aggregate fluctuations, there is little empirical evidence beyond anecdotes.3   
Central banks may exploit the existence of sunspot equilibria by guiding expectations 
through announcements or forecasts that are not backed by any interventions and thus can be 
interpreted as extrinsic information. A current example is the discussion about forward guid-
ance. The zero lower bound on interest rates introduces multiple steady state equilibria in mon-
etary macro models with active monetary policy (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe 2002). 
An implication is that an economy stuck in a liquidity trap can, theoretically, jump towards the 
steady state with target inflation provided that inflationary expectations switch to the target rate. 
This has led several scholars to suggest that central banks should provide forward guidance by 
announcing inflation forecasts in order to lead the economy out of a liquidity trap. Delphic 
forward guidance relies on market expectations following the announced forecasts and “pre-
sumably improves macroeconomic outcomes by reducing private decisionmakers’ uncertainty” 
(Campbell et al. 2012, p.2). Delphic forward guidance does not directly affect macroeconomic 
fundamentals.4 In fact, its success hinges on agents’ expectations about other agents responses. 
It is an open question whether and how central banks can guide agents’ expectations from one 
equilibrium to another by providing focal points for private sector forecasts. The mere existence 
of multiple equilibria also raises the question, whether non-official extrinsic information (like 
newspapers or opinions from popular market participants) may affect market sentiments and 
move the economy to a different equilibrium or may affect the impact of central-bank an-
nouncements.   
                                                     
3 An example is Mario Draghi’s famous statement that the European Central Bank “is ready to do whatever it takes 
to preserve the Euro. And believe me, it will be enough” (ECB, 2012). It is widely believed that these words staved 
off the speculation about a break-up of the Euro-area in 2012.  
4 Odyssean forward guidance, instead, is accompanied by a history-dependent policy commitment to keep interest 
rates low even if this is suboptimal from a forward-looking perspective (Eggertson and Woodford, 2003). Odys-
sean forward guidance contains information about future policy and should thus be seen as intrinsic information.  
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In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to test the potential effects of extrinsic 
signals, and explicitly focus on how such signals affect subjects’ ability to coordinate their be-
havior. We are particularly interested in analyzing how the likelihood for observing sunspot-
driven behavior5 depends on the degree of publicity of extrinsic signals and how the effects of 
extrinsic public announcements are influenced by co-existing idiosyncratic (private) signals. 
This allows us to provide a comprehensive picture of the potential impact of sunspots on equi-
librium selection. 
In the field, arguably it is hard to identify a particular extrinsic event (sunspot) that may 
affect agents’ choices. Even if such an event is identified, it is difficult to establish causality 
between the extrinsic event and an economic outcome.6 Benhabib and Wang (2015), for exam-
ple, show how asset prices driven by sunspot equilibria may be misinterpreted as a random walk 
in an efficient market driven by fundamentals. Relatedly, while some studies argue that self-
fulfilling beliefs may have played a role in explaining major recessions (e.g., Chauvet and Guo, 
2003), others rule out that professional forecasts were a source of output fluctuations (e.g., Choy 
et al., 2006). Laboratory experiments, instead, offer a controlled environment that permits a 
systematic exploration of the impact that extrinsic information has on economic behavior.7 
While a few experimental studies, in particular Duffy and Fisher (2005), provide evidence that 
extrinsic random signals may indeed affect subjects’ behavior after some training, little is 
                                                     
5 Throughout this paper, we call an agent’s strategy “sunspot-driven” if the agent’s actions depend on extrinsic 
signals. 
6 A recent empirical literature in financial economics explores, for example, the impact of sport events on stock 
market indices (Edmans, Garcia and Norli, 2007), of weather conditions on mood and subsequently on investment 
decision (see, e.g., Yuan, Zheng and Zhu, 2006; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2007, and references therein) or more 
generally on expectations about future economic situation (Dohmen et al., 2006). Similarly, confidence indices, 
such as the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, Ifo Business Climate Index or Survey of Professional Forecast-
ers may have an influence on growth (e.g., Enders, Kleemann, Müller, 2014). However, it is difficult to argue that 
these events or conditions have no direct effects on utility.   
7 Duffy (2016) and Cornand and Heinemann (2014) provides extensive surveys of the growing literature on labor-
atory experiments in macroeconomics and central banking.  
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known about the stochastic properties of extrinsic signals required for generating sunspot-
driven behavior.  
In our experiment, two randomly-matched subjects simultaneously pick a number from 
the interval ሾ0,100ሿ. They maximize their payoffs by choosing the same number, while devia-
tions are punished with a quadratic loss function. Each coordinated number selection constitutes 
a Nash equilibrium and payoffs do not depend upon the number that players coordinate on. 
However, picking “50” provides a natural focal point in the absence of a coordination device, 
as it minimizes the risk stemming from strategic uncertainty.8 This game nicely captures 
Keynes’ beauty contest metaphor and thus emphasizes the role of higher-order beliefs for sub-
jects’ behavior. It can be considered as a reduced form of a macro model with self-fulfilling 
prophecies, in which two professional forecasters predict the inflation rate, and the resulting 
inflation rate will be determined by the average forecast. 
The extrinsic signals (sunspots) are binary random variables unrelated to payoffs, with 
realizations being either 0 or 100. These signals have four properties that we exploit. First, 
signals are semantically meaningful as they clearly map to the action space.9 Second, the signal 
structure allows us to easily vary the likelihood that players receive the same signal and there-
fore we are able to identify necessary stochastic conditions for generating sunspot-driven be-
havior. Third, the signals are extreme in the sense that they point towards the lowest or highest 
possible action, which maximizes the tension between the signals and the risk minimum as focal 
points. Finally, equilibria can be ordered by risk-dominance, which enables us to measure the 
power of sunspots by how distant actions are from 50.  
                                                     
8 Focal points may provide a natural way to break the payoff symmetry in pure coordination games where the 
game’s formal structure provides no guidance for equilibrium selection (Schelling, 1960). 
9 Previous research has shown that signals need to be semantically meaningful for generating sunspot equilibria in 
the lab (Duffy and Fisher 2005). 
5 
 
We find that sunspot-driven behavior does not require priming subjects to believe in 
sunspots nor is it restricted to situations with a public signal. We rather show that sunspot equi-
libria arise naturally with salient public signals. When subjects receive only public signals, they 
reliably converge to the sunspot equilibrium that is implied by the signals’ semantic. However, 
extrinsic private signals may have a significant impact on behavior as well. Highly correlated 
private signals lead some groups of subjects to coordinate on a non-equilibrium strategy in 
which actions are also conditioned on their signals.  
Coordination on the salient sunspot equilibrium is less pronounced when public and 
private signals interact. Some subjects then condition their actions on the private signal, which 
either prevents full coordination or leads to an intermediate sunspot equilibrium that is closer 
to 50 than under the absence of private signals. This implies that private signals reduce the 
power of the public signal to serve as a focal point for actions. In some cases, private signals 
completely wipe out the focal-point character of public signals, so that subjects either ignore all 
signals or do not manage to coordinate on any equilibrium.  
Our results indicate that the likelihood of sunspot-driven actions and their impact rises 
continuously in the correlation of signals and that the power of sunspots is significantly lower 
if public and private signals are combined. These results are of both practical and theoretical 
importance. From a practical point of view, our results contribute to a better understanding of 
the causes for a sudden swing of expectations and a reversal of capital flows triggering financial 
crises. They may also be useful for understanding communication strategies of central banks, 
such as forward guidance.10 Salient public messages can indeed change beliefs and behavior in 
                                                     
10 Reis (2012) discusses the importance of announcements and accountability for forward guidance in the light of 
time inconsistency associated with Odyssean forward guidance. 
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the desired direction, even if they are not backed by a commitment to actions affecting funda-
mentals. However, in a world of public and private messages, the power of public messages 
may be lower and adding public signals to existing private signals may even reduce welfare.   
These results add a different perspective to the recent discussion of the effectiveness of 
forward guidance. Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2015) argue that in DSGE models, 
credible announcements of interest rate projections have larger effects on key macroeconomic 
variables than seem empirically plausible. Several recent contributions try to resolve this “for-
ward guidance puzzle”, for example, by modifying the micro-foundations of the New-Keynes-
ian framework (Gabaix, 2016; McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson, 2016) or by relaxing the com-
mon knowledge assumption about policies and agents’ behavior (Angeletos and Lian, 2016).11 
The findings of the present paper in conjunction with previous experiments on sunspots suggest 
that central bank communication may not be as powerful as predicted because of coordination 
frictions. If public signals lack salience and, thus, do not provide focal points for beliefs, or if 
central bank announcements compete for attention with already existing private forecasts of 
similar salience, agents may find it hard to coordinate their beliefs and actions.  
On the theory side, our results support that sunspot equilibria are not just a theoretical 
curiosity but a serious phenomenon that reliably shows up whenever agents’ focus is directed 
towards salient extrinsic public signals. Agents may also coordinate on extrinsic private signals, 
even though such strategies do not constitute an equilibrium. This is in line with the model of 
near-rational behavior (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen, 1985) and related to rational inattention as laid 
out in Sims (2010). Finally, our observation that different groups may converge to different 
equilibria in the same environment conflicts with selection theories that single out a unique 
                                                     
11 Gabaix (2016) incorporates myopic agents into a “behavioral” New-Keynesian framework, which naturally at-
tenuates the impact of future shocks, while McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016) consider an incomplete mar-
ket model where agents face income risk and borrowing constraints. In Angeletos and Lian (2016), forward guid-
ance is modelled by intrinsic private signals. Since agents lack common knowledge, they cannot perfectly coordi-
nate their actions, which make forward guidance less effective.  
7 
 
strategy combination for each game and calls for probabilistic theories to describe aggregate 
behavior. 
Our study also complements the literature on the emergence of sunspots in the labora-
tory, which has mostly focused on public extrinsic information. Marimon, Spear and Sunder 
(1993) show that subjects who learned to condition their price forecasts on a periodic intrinsic 
signal continue conditioning their actions once the signal becomes extrinsic. Duffy and Fisher 
(2005) were the first to show that random messages can be strong enough to sustain a sunspot 
equilibrium, provided that they are semantically salient. A few more recent experiments have 
explored the impact of sunspots when equilibria can be Pareto ranked. Arifovic, Evans, and 
Kostyshyna (2013) demonstrate that sunspots can sustain coordination on a payoff-dominated 
equilibrium in a production economy where subjects have to forecast the average production 
level. Subjects are less coordinated when equilibria are Pareto-ranked than in a comparable 
treatment in which payoffs are independent of the equilibrium. Arifovic and Jiang (2013) focus 
on a bank-run game and find that sunspots may only affect behavior if strategic uncertainty is 
high, i.e., when the tension between efficiency and security is high. Beugnot et al. (2009) find 
no evidence for coordination on a sunspot equilibrium if there is a non-sunspot equilibrium that 
is payoff-dominant, maximin, and weakly risk-dominant. 
A common feature of the previously mentioned experiments (except Beugnot et al., 
2009) is that subjects are trained to believe in the sunspot in order to generate sunspot equilibria. 
Our experiment shows for the first time that sunspot equilibria may arise endogenously without 
any need of training. Moreover, in contrast to the previous papers, we investigate situations 
with private signals that allow us to draw more general inferences about the power of sunspots. 
Indeed, our results suggest that private signals can generate sunspot-driven behavior if the sig-
nals obtained by different agents are sufficiently correlated, and private signals can attenuate 
the power of public signals as sunspot variables.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
The game that we use for the experiment is a pure coordination game. It can be considered as a 
reduced form of a macro model with self-fulfilling prophecies, in which professional forecasters 
predict the inflation rate, and the resulting inflation rate will be determined by the average fore-
cast. Forecasters have an incentive to provide accurate forecasts and this accuracy is higher the 
closer an individual forecast is to the average. In the experiment, we consider a two-player 
version of this game. Thus, both forecasters’ payoffs are decreasing in the distance between 
their individual forecasts.  
Formally, two agents i and j independently and simultaneously pick actions ܽ௜, ௝ܽ ∈
ሾܾ, ܿሿ. Agent i’s payoff is given by  
                      	ߨ௜൫ܽ௜, ௝ܽ൯ ൌ ܣ െ ݀൫ܽ௜ െ ௝ܽ൯ଶ ݓ݅ݐ݄ ܣ ൐ 0, ݀ ൐ 0.   (1)
Agent i maximizes her payoff when she matches agent j’s action. Clearly, any coordinated pick 
of numbers constitutes a Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, both agents receive the same 
payoff and, moreover, the payoff is exactly the same in all equilibria. 
2.1 Equilibria with Signals  
Delphic Forward guidance can be introduced in this game as a payoff-irrelevant public signal 
that provides a focal point for expectations and possibly competes with private announcements 
on the same topic. Let Φ be the set of all the possible public signals that agents might receive 
and let Ψ௜ be the set of possible private signals for agent i. For ease of presentation, let us 
assume that Ψ௜ ൌ Ψ for both i (as in the experiment), and Ψ is finite. Let ܲ: ሺΦ,Ψ,Ψሻ → ሾ0,1	ሿ 
be the joint probability distribution on the signals, where P assigns strictly positive probabilities 
on each element in ሺΦ,Ψ,Ψሻ. A strategy is mapping signals to the interval ሾܾ, ܿሿ. The following 
proposition states that equilibrium strategies do not depend on private signals. 
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Proposition 1: Let ݏ∗ be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy profile, where ݏ௜∗ሺ߮, ߰௜ሻ is the 
action played by agent i with public signal ߮ and private signal ߰௜. In equilibrium, actions are 
the same for both agents and do not depend on the private signal, that is, for any given public 
signal ߮ ∈ Φ:	ݏ௜∗ሺ߮, ߰௜ሻ ൌ ݏ௝∗൫߮, ߰௝൯		for	all	߰௜, ߰௝ ∈ Ψ. 
Proof: see Appendix A.■  
Proposition 1 implies that private signals are ignored in equilibrium. Consequently, the 
set of Nash equilibria is the same as in a version of the game without private signals. The intu-
ition for this result is the following. If, for any public signal, a player’s action depends on her 
private signal, the best response of the other player is closer to the first player’s expected action 
given the public signal. Iterative best response leads actions to converge to strategies that may 
only depend on public signals. When there is a public signal, sunspot equilibria exist in which 
both agents condition their actions on the public signal. Any function ݂:Φ → ሾܾ, ܿሿ is an equi-
librium, provided that both agents follow the same function and, thus, are always perfectly co-
ordinated.12 In the interpretation of this model, forward guidance may move expectations in the 
desired direction, but there are also equilibria with opposing or no effects of public messages. 
2.2 Riskiness of Equilibria 
For analyzing the results of the experiment, it is helpful that equilibria can be ordered by the 
risk-dominance criterion in the notion of Haruvy and Stahl (2004) that is based on a heuristic 
justification by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).13 According to this criterion, an equilibrium strat-
egy is risk dominant if it maximizes the expected payoff in an initial state of uncertainty where 
                                                     
12 Proposition 1 can be extended to show that every correlated equilibrium must also fulfill the condition that 
ݏ௜∗ሺ߮, ߰௜ሻ ൌ ݏ௝∗൫߮,߰௝൯	∀	߰௜, ߰௝ ∈ Ψ. Therefore, in the game presented, the set of correlated equilibria and the set 
of Bayesian Nash equilibria coincide. This differs from Angeletos (2008) who presents a threshold game in which 
there are equilibria with strategies depending on imperfectly correlated signals that may be interpreted as private 
sunspots. Duffy and Feltovich (2010) provide experimental evidence for correlated equilibria. 
13 In its original formulation by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), risk dominance is a binary relation that may be in-
transitive and does not provide a strict order in our game.	In any restricted version of our game allowing for just 
two actions, both actions are equally risky. 
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the players have uniformly distributed second-order beliefs on all equilibria. This notion pro-
vides a transitive order of risk dominance, which is, in our game, inverse to the distance of a 
strategy from the midpoint of the action space ሾܾ, ܿሿ. That is, a strategy that is closer to the 
midpoint risk dominates a strategy further away from the midpoint.  
Our next result establishes this order, characterizes the risk dominant equilibrium and 
shows that it coincides with the action that maximizes the minimum possible payoff, known as 
the secure action (see Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1990). Moreover, it shows that the selected 
equilibrium is independent of the generated signals. 
Proposition 2:  ,
2
),(*  cbs ii  is both the secure action and the risk-dominant equi-
librium. If ቚݏ௜ሺ߮, ߰௜ሻ െ ௕ା௖ଶ ቚ ൏ ቚ̃ݏ௜ሺ߮, ߰௜ሻ െ
௕ା௖
ଶ ቚ	 for all ߮,߰௜, then ݏ௜ risk dominates ̃ݏ௜. 
Proof: see Appendix A.■ 
Both measures of risk (risk dominance and minimal possible payoff) can be expressed 
as a function increasing in the absolute distance between an action and	ሺܾ ൅ ܿሻ/2. Therefore, 
throughout the rest of the paper, we will interpret the absolute distance to ሺܾ ൅ ܿሻ/2 as a meas-
ure of risk. We will say that an extrinsic signal or a combination of extrinsic signals exerts a 
stronger effect on behavior than another signal, if the average distance between chosen actions 
and the midpoint ሺܾ ൅ ܿሻ/2 is larger.  
3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses  
Game setup: In the experiment, subjects repeatedly play the coordination game explained 
above. At the beginning, subjects are randomly assigned to fixed groups of six and in each 
period they are randomly matched into pairs within these groups. Subjects have to choose, in-
dependently and simultaneously, an integer between 0 and 100 (both included) and the payoff 
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function is given by (1) with A=200 and d=1/50.14 Subjects play the game for 80 periods. After 
each period, they are informed about their partner’s choice, the distance between their own 
choice and their partner’s choice, and the resulting payoff.  
Extrinsic information: To supplement the coordination game with extrinsic information, the 
computer draws a random number ܼ ∈ ሼ0,100ሽ in each period. Both numbers are equally likely 
and the realization is not disclosed to the subjects (except in one control treatment). Instead, 
each subject in a pair receives at least one signal ݏ ∈ ሼ0,100ሽ. With probability ݌ ∈ ሾ0.5,1ሿ, 
signal ݏ is the same as the random number Z, that is, ݌ݎ݋ܾሺݏ ൌ 0|ܼ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ ݌ݎ݋ܾሺݏ ൌ 100|ܼ ൌ
100ሻ ൌ ݌. Probability p measures the precision of signals and is one of our treatment variables. 
The more precise the signals are, the higher is the correlation between two signals, and the 
greater is the likelihood that both signals are the same. The random number Z allows us to use 
the same framing of signals across different treatments and it introduces correlations that can 
be understood by subjects without statistical training. In all treatments subjects are informed 
about how the signals are generated including the treatment-specific probabilities. 15 
Treatments: In all treatments, subjects play the coordination game introduced in Section 2. In 
the benchmark treatment (Treatment N “No signal”) subjects receive no extrinsic information, 
whereas in all other treatments they receive some extrinsic information (signals). More specif-
ically, we vary (i) the probability with which subjects receive the same signal, and (ii) the num-
ber of signals that a subject receives.  
                                                     
14 In contrast to the game in Section 3, subjects could only choose integers between 0 and 100 instead of choosing 
from an interval of real numbers. Technically, strategies assigning different numbers to different private signals 
are equilibria if the difference between the two chosen numbers is at most 5 (1) in treatments with a high (low) 
correlation of private signals. We do not observe these contrived equilibria and therefore ignore them in the fol-
lowing analysis. 
15 The instructions explained the payoff function (2) in detail and subjects had to answer questions about the game’s 
procedures and in particular how the payoffs were determined before the experiment started. These questions 
ensured that subjects understood how their payoff would be determined and, in particular, that neither the number 
Z, nor the signals would affect their payoff. Moreover, subjects could clarify any last-minute questions and gain 
confidence that the other players understood the game.  
12 
 
In Treatment C (“Common signal”), subjects always receive a common (public) signal 
ܻ ൌ 0 or ܻ ൌ 100. It equals Z with probability ݌	 ൌ 	0.75, and it is common information that 
both subjects in the pair receive the same signal. In Treatments P75 and P95, each subject in a 
pair receives a conditionally independent ”Private signal” ௜ܺ. The probability p with which 
signal ௜ܺ coincides with the number Z is 0.75 in P75 and 0.95 in P95. In Treatment CP (“Com-
mon and Private signal”), a subject receives both a common (public) signal Y and a private 
signal ௜ܺ. Signals are drawn independently conditional on Z and each signal coincides with the 
random number Z with probability p = 0.75.  
Subjects are always informed about which signal conveys public and private infor-
mation and subjects never learn their partners’ private signal. Though, after each period, sub-
jects are informed about the realization of the random variable Z. We also implemented two 
further treatments (Treatment AC “Almost Common signal” and CC “Two Common signals”) 
as robustness checks that will be explained in Section 4.4. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
different treatments. 
Proposition 1 implies that the set of equilibria in Treatments P75 and P95 coincides with 
the set of equilibria in Treatment N. In Treatments C and CP any function mapping public 
signals to ሾ0,100ሿ is an equilibrium.  
Table 1: Treatment Overview 
Treat-
ment 
Public 
signals  
Private signals 
per subject 
Precision p Existence of sun-
spot equilibria 
Number of subjects / 
number of groups 
N - - - No 36 /   6 
P75 - 1   75% No 36 /   6 
P95 - 1   95% No 36 /   6 
AC - 1* 100% No 36 /   6 
C 1 -   75% Yes 36 /   6 
CP 1 1   75% Yes 72 / 12 
CC 2 -   75% Yes 36 /   6 
Note: *common signal revealed to each subject with 90 percent probability 
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Procedures: In total, 288 undergraduate students from various fields of study (engineering, 
business administration, mathematics, chemistry, etc.) participated in the experiment at Tech-
nische Universität Berlin.16 At the end of a session, we determined the subjects’ earnings by 
randomly selecting 10 out of the 80 periods for payment. The payoffs in these rounds were 
converted to euros (1 point = 1 euro cent). Sessions lasted about one hour. Subjects were paid 
in private and earned, on average, 21 euros (including a fee of 3 euros for showing up). 
Hypotheses: We want to learn how strongly public and private extrinsic signals affect behavior. 
The first hypothesis provides a benchmark for behavior in absence of extrinsic signals: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1):  In the absence of extrinsic signals, subjects coor-
dinate on 50. 
As previously emphasized, any coordinated pick constitutes an equilibrium. However, as ex-
plained in Section 2, 50 minimizes strategic risk.17  
The main goal of the experiment is to understand how different information structures 
affect the salience of signal(s), so that public or private signals pull behavior away from the risk 
minimizing action 50 towards the number(s) indicated by the signal(s). We refer to this charac-
teristic as the power of sunspots. Our design gives us two natural measures for the power of 
sunspots: (i) the number of groups in each treatment who coordinate on strategies that are driven 
by sunspots and (ii) the average distance of chosen actions from 50 (given that H1 is not re-
jected).  
If extrinsic signals affect behavior, we should see significant differences between treat-
ments with extrinsic signals and Treatment N. Thus, our null hypothesis is: 
                                                     
16 The experiment was computerized using the software toolkit z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and we recruited sub-
jects from a database where students can register to participate in economic experiments (ORSEE, Greiner 2015). 
For a more detailed description of the procedures and sample instructions, see Appendix D and E. 
17 Additionally, choosing the midpoint of the interval is the unique equilibrium in symmetric strategies according 
to the theory of focal points by Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2013) and constitutes the best response to a random 
choice by the other player. 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): With extrinsic signals, subjects coordinate on the same strategies 
as without extrinsic signals. 
Alternatively, we may observe the emergence of sunspot-driven behavior. In that case, we ex-
pect the semantics to matter such that players choose higher actions for signal 100 than for 
signal 0. If H2 is rejected, we can analyze how the power of sunspots is driven by the correlation 
between players’ signals: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3):  The power of an extrinsic signal rises in the prob-
ability that the other subject receives the same signal.  
This probability is 62.5% in P75, 90.5% in P95 and 100% in C. Finally, the next hypothesis is 
used to analyze how the interaction of different signals affects their power. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4):  When subjects receive public and private signals, the 
respective power of these signals is the same as in treatments with pure public 
or private signals of the same precision.  
Since private signals should be ignored in equilibrium, we should observe convergence to the 
same strategies in Treatments CP and C. The alternatives are that private signals exert some 
power themselves or change the attractiveness of public signals as focal points.  
4. Results 
As explained above we rely on two natural measures for the power of sunspots. First, we meas-
ure the power of sunspots by how distant the chosen actions are from 50. In order to simplify 
the analysis, we utilize that subjects’ strategies are symmetric with respect to the signals. In 
other words, subjects who choose ܽ௜ ൌ ݉ when they receive signal ݏ	 ൌ 	0 play ܽ௜ ൌ 100 െ݉ 
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when their signal is ݏ	 ൌ 	100.18 If extrinsic signals affect behavior, they raise the average dis-
tance of choices from 50. To get a sense how coordinated such deviations from 50 are, we 
complement the “distance from 50” with the coordination rate, defined as the proportion of 
pairings in which the actions of the two subjects are the same or deviate by one. 
Second, we focus on the number of groups that coordinate on sunspot-driven strategies. 
Because we cannot expect that subjects’ actions are in equilibrium from the start of a session, 
we are mostly interested in subjects’ behavior after some convergence periods. To check 
whether groups coordinated their actions by converging to a common strategy we introduce two 
convergence criteria. The strong convergence criterion requires that all six subjects in a match-
ing group play according to the same strategy, allowing a deviation of ±1, in Periods 70–79. 
The weak convergence criterion requires that at least four subjects in a matching group follow 
the same strategy, allowing a deviation of ±3, in Periods 70–79.19  
For converging groups, we identify four types of strategies they coordinated on: 1) “50”: 
the secure action; 2) intermediate sunspot strategies, such as “25/75” or “10/90”, in which sub-
jects choose the lower number when the signal is 0 and the higher number when the signal is 
100; 3) “0/100”: follow the signal; 4) “Mean”: play the average of both signals. In Treatment 
CP, strategies of types 2) and 3) refer to the public signal only.   
  
                                                     
18 In Treatments CP and CC, symmetry refers to playing m when both signals are 0, 100-m when both signals are 
100. When the two signals are different in CP, symmetry requires that a player who chooses n when the public 
signal is 0 and the private signal is 100, plays 100-n when the public signal is 100 and the private signal is 0. For 
two distinct public signals in Treatment CC, symmetry prescribes playing 50 as in Treatment N. In Appendix B, 
we show that symmetry applies to actions played during the entire experiment and to the strategies subjects con-
verged to. 
19 We do not include Period 80, because some subjects deviate exclusively in the last period. Tables C1 and C2 in 
Appendix C show more detailed results including the periods in which the groups converged to a particular strategy 
according to the strong and weak convergence criterion.  
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Table 2: Coordination Summary. 
Treatment N P75 P95 AC C CP CC 
Number of groups 6 6 6 6 6 12 6 
Coordinated groupsa 5 (6) 5 (6) 3 (5) 5 (6) 4 (6) 6 (8) 4 (6) 
Strategiesb        
           “50” 
 
5 (6) 
[3] 
5 (6) 
[9] 
3 (3)
[8.5] 
4 (4) 
[2] 
- 1 (1) 
[8] 
- 
           “25/75”  
 
n.a. - - - - 1 (2) 
[59] 
n.a. 
           “10/90”  
 
n.a. - 0 (2)
[65] 
- - - n.a. 
           “0/100” 
 
n.a. - - 1 (2) 
[35.5] 
4 (6) 
[4.5] 
4 (5) 
[22] 
n.a. 
           “Mean” 
 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - 4 (6) 
[3.5] 
Avg. distance to 50 0.81 2.51 17.25 13.86 46.69 31.57 30.50 
a  “Coordinated groups” indicates the number of groups who converged according to the strong  convergence 
criterion (weak convergence criterion in parentheses).  
b  “Strategies” details the number of groups converging to the identified strategy (weak criterion in parenthe-
ses). The median period in which groups converged according to the weak criterion is reported in brackets.  
 
 
Table 2 reports how many groups converged according to the two criteria (strong and weak 
convergence) for each treatment. The first row indicates how many groups converged to a joint 
strategy according to the strong (weak) criterion. The rows below provide a more detailed pic-
ture and show for each identified strategy the number of groups who converged to this strategy 
along with the median period of weak convergence in brackets.  
4.1 Single signals and sunspot-driven behavior 
Setting the stage for the further analyses, we first test whether the secure action serves 
as focal point in the absence of extrinsic signals (Treatment N). Table 2 shows that all groups 
converged to “50” and the median time for weak convergence is only 3 periods. Figure 1 depicts 
the evolution of the average distance to 50 over the 80 periods for Treatments N and C. It is 
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apparent that subjects quickly converged to playing ܽ௜ ൌ 50 in Treatment N. The average dis-
tance of actions from 50 was 0.81 and the average coordination rate was 92 percent. When 
testing whether actual choices are distributed around 50, we cannot reject hypothesis H1 (Wil-
coxon signed-rank test, p = 0.6, two-sided).20  
Figure 1: Average Distance to 50 in Treatments N and C 
 
We now focus on the treatments with extrinsic signals. We first test, whether extrinsic signals 
have an effect at all (Hypothesis 2) and then whether the impact of extrinsic signals increases 
in the probability that both subjects receive the same signal (Hypothesis 3). Using group-spe-
cific averages as independent observations, we can reject that the average distances are equal 
across Treatments N, P75, P95, and C according to a Kruskal-Wallis test (p < 0.01).   
In Treatment C, in which an extrinsic signal is publicly available, there is a clear con-
vergence process towards choosing the action that is indicated by the signal. Indeed, all groups 
converged to playing ܽ௜ ൌ ܻ (see Table 2) and the average coordination rate was 83 percent. 
                                                     
20 In all nonparametric tests we used a matching group as an independent observation, because from Period 2 
onwards, individual choices were affected by observing other group members. Unless otherwise noted, we aggre-
gated the data across all 80 periods in a matching group. Note that this presents a conservative way to detect any 
significant effects. If not indicated otherwise, all results obtained by using the Mann-Whitney test are robust to 
using the robust rank-order test (see Feltovich (2003) for a discussion of this test). 
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The average absolute distance to 50 was 46.69 over all periods and 49.82 during the last 10 
periods (see Figure 1). In the end, all subjects followed the public signal. This is remarkable 
since no previous experiment has generated sunspot equilibria without subjects being trained to 
follow the sunspots. Obviously, we can reject Hypothesis H2 of no difference in the average 
distance between Treatments N and C (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01, two-sided).  
Result 1: Sunspot equilibria emerge reliably in the presence of a salient (but extrinsic) 
public signal. 
Table 2 reveals that different groups converged to different strategies in treatments with private 
signals. While in Treatment P75 all groups converged to 50, this is not the case when private 
signals are highly correlated as in Treatment P95. Here, we observe two groups that coordinated 
on sunspot-driven strategies even though this is not an equilibrium. This behavior is also re-
flected in the average distance to 50.  
Figure 2: Average Distance to 50 in Treatments P75 and P95 
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Figure 2 plots the average distance to 50 by blocks of 10 periods in these treatments separately 
for each group. While the average distance is close to zero in all groups of Treatment P75, it is 
either close to or deviates substantially from zero in Treatment P95. For example, the average 
distance is about 40 in Groups 13 and 14, and it hovers around 20 in Group 18.  Over all groups, 
the average distance to 50 in Treatment P95 is 17.3. A pair-wise comparison of Treatment N 
with P75 shows no significant difference in the average distance to 50 (Mann-Whitney test, p 
= 0.109, two-sided). However, we can clearly reject that average distances are equal in N and 
in P95 (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01, two-sided). Highly correlated private signals not only 
result in a larger absolute distance to 50, but also in lower coordination rates. Subjects are less 
likely to be coordinated in P95 (65 percent) than in P75 (85 percent) or C (83 percent).  
Result 2: Sunspot-driven behavior can arise with highly correlated extrinsic private 
signals even though this is no equilibrium.  
Recall that the probability that both subjects see the same signal is 62.5 percent in Treatment 
P75, 90.5 percent in P95, and 100 percent in Treatment C. As suggested by Hypothesis 3, we 
observe that the average distance from 50 is larger, the higher the probability that both players 
get the same signal is. According to a Jonckheere-Terpstra test, we can reject the hypothesis 
that the distance from 50 is independent from the probability that both players receive the same 
signal in treatments P75, P95 and C (p < 0.01) in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the 
distance rises in this probability.21  
  
                                                     
21 The Jonckheere-Terpstra test is a non-parametric test for ordered alternatives, i.e., it tests the null hypothesis of 
P75 = P95 = C against the alternative hypothesis of P75 ≤ P95 ≤ C with at least one strict equality.   
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Table 3: Panel Regression 
dependent variable: distance to 50 coordination rate 
  period 1-10 period 11-80 all periods all periods 
P75 9.306*** 0.612 1.698** -0.070 
 (3.308) (0.562) (0.684) (0.061) 
P95 20.694*** 15.835** 16.443** -0.271** 
 (5.067) (7.327) (6.963) (0.122) 
C 38.894*** 46.875*** 45.877*** -0.083 
 (3.375) (2.309) (2.393) (0.085) 
Constant 3.792*** 0.388*** 0.814*** 0.920*** 
  (1.370) (0.142) (0.250) (0.029) 
Tests#:  
P75=P95 0.024 0.019 0.018 - 
P95=C 0.005 0.000 0.000 - 
N 1440 10080 11520 5760 
R² 0.43 0.72 0.67 0.07 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
Random-effects panel regressions with standard errors clustered at the matching group level. The 
dependent variable in Column 1-3 is the distance of a choice to 50 and in Column 4 the coordination 
rate, which is the proportion of pairings choosing the same action (with a maximum deviation of 
+/-1). 
# Tests: The p-values correspond to Wald tests (one-sided) based on the regression results and are 
adjusted for multiple testing using Holm’s method.  
 
 
 
Table 3 presents additional evidence for the impact of extrinsic signals on behavior using panel 
regressions. The dependent variable is the distance to 50, which is regressed on treatment dum-
mies for P75, P95, and C (Treatment N serves as the baseline). The regression in column 3 
considers all 80 periods and shows a significant impact of extrinsic signals on the distance from 
50 for all three treatments (P75, P95 and C). However, the effect size in P75 is close to zero 
and insignificant if we consider periods 11-80 (Column 2). In contrast, the coefficients for P95 
and C are significantly different from N irrespective of the time horizon we look at. The regres-
sion provides further support for Hypothesis 3, i.e., that the average distance rises in the prob-
ability that both subjects receive the same signal. Wald tests confirm that the average distance 
to 50 is significantly larger in P95 than in P75 and significantly larger in C than in P95. Note 
that controlling for the period or the behavior of the opponent in the previous period does not 
affect the qualitative results. 
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Result 3: The power of an extrinsic signal rises in the probability that the other subject 
receives the same signal.  
Our results suggest that subjects do react to private signals. Sunspot-driven behavior can emerge 
when the correlation between private signals is sufficiently high as in P95. While this is in 
contradiction to the theoretical prediction that sunspot equilibria do not exist with imperfect 
correlation of signals, it is consistent with the notion that subjects engage in a cost-benefit trade-
off of additional steps of reasoning. In P95 the high correlation of private signals implies that 
the payoff difference between following one’s own private signal and best responding to an 
opponent who follows his private signal is small. Thus for some subjects, the cost of engaging 
in an additional step of reasoning and calculating the best response may outweigh the gain from 
best responding, in which case subjects display sunspot-driven behavior with no tendency to-
wards the secure action.22 However, if the correlation of private signals is as low as in P75, it 
is more profitable to find the optimal response against a subject who plays her signal and thus 
subjects quickly learn to ignore their private signals. 
4.2 The Interaction of Public and Private Signals 
The previous analysis has highlighted that sunspot-driven behavior emerges with increasing 
correlation of the signals and that sunspot equilibria reliably occur when salient public infor-
mation is available. We now turn to the question how robust such behavior is in the presence 
of multiple information sources. To answer this question, we focus on Treatment CP where 
subjects received two signals; a common (public) and a private signal. We compare the effects 
of both signals to their effects in Treatments C and P75, where subjects received either a com-
mon or a private signal of the same precision. 
                                                     
22 For example, in P95 the expected payoff when both players follow their signal is €1.81 compared to €1.83 from 
best responding to an opponent who follows the signal by moving closer to 50. In P75, the difference is more 
substantial (€1.25 versus €1.53). This is akin to the model of near-rational behavior by Akerlof and Yellen (1985) 
showing that small deviations from optimal behavior can lead to large aggregate fluctuations (for experimental 
evidence on how near-rational behavior interacts with the strategic environment see Fehr and Tyran, 2008). 
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Table 2 shows that different groups converged to different equilibria in Treatment CP, 
while they all converged to ignoring the signal in P75 and following it in C. Figure 3 shows the 
average distance to 50 by 10-period blocks conditional on receiving aligned and unaligned sig-
nals for all groups in Treatment CP.23 Recall that equilibrium strategies do not depend on private 
signals. Thus, in equilibrium, the average distance is the same for aligned and unaligned signals. 
Figure 3: Average Distance to 50 in Treatment CP 
 
We observe that the average distance is substantially larger than zero throughout all periods for 
all but one group (Group 33). While some groups did not manage to reach an equilibrium, the 
                                                     
23 For a more comprehensive overview on each independent group, including the periods of convergence, see 
Table C2 in Appendix C. 
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average distance for groups converging to a sunspot equilibrium was either close to the maxi-
mum distance of 50 or close to 25. Over all groups, the average distance was 31.6. Clearly, this 
is substantially larger than in Treatment P75 (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01, two-sided) but 
smaller than in Treatment C (Mann-Whitney tests, p < 0.02, two-sided).  
There are three possible explanations of why choices in Treatment CP are closer to the 
secure action than in Treatment C: (i) private signals might exert some power themselves, so 
that opposing signals (e.g., ܻ ൌ 0 and ௜ܺ ൌ 100) lead to actions closer to 50 than aligned sig-
nals, (ii) private signals might reduce the power of public signals, or (iii) the mere presence of 
multiple signals impedes their ability to serve as focal-points. In the following, we present evi-
dence in support of explanations (i) and (ii) by comparing the power of sunspots between Treat-
ment CP and Treatments P75 and C, respectively. In Section 4.3 we present evidence against 
explanation (iii) by comparing Treatment CP with CC. 
For a direct test of Hypothesis 4, we measure the impact of each signal type by the 
difference between actions for a low and high realization, holding the other signal constant. We 
compare these measures to the respective differences in Treatments P75 and C, where they are 
twice the distance to 50. 
In Treatment CP, the average distance to the secure action was 35.19 when the public 
and the private signal coincided and 26.12 otherwise. In other words, holding the public signal 
fixed, a low private signal led to actions that were about 9.07 lower than actions with a high 
private signal. This difference is statistically significant according to a Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
test (p < 0.01, two-sided), which establishes that private signals exert some power on their own, 
as suggested by explanation (i) above. The effect of private signals on choices is larger than in 
Treatment P75, where the average distance between actions for low and high signals was 5.02. 
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Albeit the difference in the power of private signals between the two treatments is not signifi-
cant (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.15, two-sided), so that we cannot reject Hypothesis 4 with 
respect to private signals.  
Holding the private signal constant, a low public signal led to actions that were on av-
erage 61.3 lower than actions with a high public signal. This distance is significantly smaller 
than in C, where it was 93.4 (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.02, two-sided). In fact, the deviation 
from 50 for aligned signals is significantly smaller than in Treatment C (Mann-Whitney test, p 
< 0.06, two-sided). Consequently, even the combined power of public and private signals is 
smaller than the power of the public signal in C. The smaller average distance to 50 in Treatment 
CP (as compared to C) is, thus, mainly due to the reduced power of the public signal.  
There is substantial heterogeneity in the coordination rates among groups: they are sig-
nificantly higher for groups that follow the public signal or converge to 50 than for other groups. 
The coordination rate is positively correlated with the average distance (Spearman’s rank cor-
relation, p = 0.01). This suggests that the beneficial role of public signals in coordinating ac-
tions is related to their power in dragging actions away from 50. Overall, the coordination rate 
in Treatment CP is only 55 percent and well below the coordination rate in C (83 percent, Mann-
Whitney test, p < 0.06, two-sided). Thus, the presence of a private signal not only reduces the 
power of the public signal in dragging actions away from 50, but also impairs its ability to 
coordinate actions. Coordination is also lower than in P75 (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.05, two-
sided): while private signals with a low correlation cannot hamper coordination by themselves, 
they can have a rather devastating effect in an environment with equally salient public signals.  
Result 4: Private signals reduce the power of public signals as coordinating devices.  
Why do private signals attenuate the power of pubic signals? Coordination becomes consider-
ably more difficult with private and public signals, presumably because subjects need to learn 
that (i) the private signal should be ignored and (ii) it may be good to condition one’s action on 
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the public signal, even though it is intrinsically irrelevant. Apparently, this learning process 
takes longer than learning only one of these points in the other treatments.   
This is vividly illustrated by the process of convergence to intermediate sunspot equi-
libria. At least three groups converged to an intermediate sunspot equilibrium in which subjects 
chose 25 whenever Y=0 and 75 when Y=100.24 Such an intermediate sunspot equilibrium that 
is not implied by the semantics of signals has never been observed before. In fact, very few (2 
out of 72) subjects in this treatment chose 25 or 75 in the first period. It may rather be the result 
of applying the maximin rule (maximize the minimum payoff). There are three popular strate-
gies that are implied by the salience of signals: the secure action, following the public signal, 
and choosing the mean of both signals. In the first period, 32 percent of all subjects chose the 
secure action and 43 percent followed the public signal. Thereby, 75 percent of first-period 
actions were consistent with any of these 3 strategies. The strategy “25/75” is the maximin 
response to any non-degenerate distribution of the three popular strategies that subjects played 
in the first period. Thus, it seems that the same force that drives actions to 50 in the absence of 
signals drives some groups to an intermediate sunspot equilibrium in the presence of public and 
private signals.   
4.3. Robustness Checks 
Multiple public signals: Are the reduced power of the public signal and the eventual occur-
rence of intermediate sunspot equilibria in Treatment CP really due to the coexistence of public 
and private signals or are they just caused by the presence of multiple signals? To address this 
question, we implemented Treatment CC, in which subjects receive two common (=public) 
signals with the same precision as in Treatment CP. Any effect driven by augmenting a public 
                                                     
24 The coordination rate in these groups (37 percent) is considerably lower than in groups converging to the public 
signal (78 percent) but higher than in non-converging groups (22 percent) While three groups converged according 
to our weak criterion (see Table 2), two more groups show a tendency towards “25/75” but 80 periods were not 
long enough to reach a common strategy.  
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with a private signal in CP should be absent in CC, while effects merely driven by the number 
of signals can be identified by comparing Treatments CC and C.  
In CC, all groups converged to choosing the mean of both signals, which is the salient 
aggregate of the two signals. The coordination rate in CC was 89 percent, which is similar to C 
(83 percent, Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.81, two-sided). The average distance between the chosen 
actions and the secure action is 30.5 and, thus, almost the same as in CP (31.57). However, this 
is mainly due to the cases in which the two signals are not aligned. If signals are aligned, the 
distance is 48.97. This distance is approximately the same as in Treatment C (46.69, Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0.44, two-sided), but significantly larger than in CP (Mann-Whitney test, p < 
0.02, two-sided). Thus, we cannot reject that the combined power of two equally salient public 
signals is the same as the power of a single public signal. If the two signals were unaligned, the 
average distance (2.79) is about the same as in Treatment N (2.51, Mann-Whitney test, p > 
0.33, two-sided). Therefore, unaligned public signals that are equally salient neutralize each 
other.  
Together, these tests establish that the lower power of public signals in CP is not due to 
the multiplicity of signals, but due to the combination of public and private signals. If multiple 
public signals can be aggregated in a simple way, then subjects quickly learn how to do it and 
use the aggregated signal as focal point for coordinating actions. Treatment CC also supports 
Result 1, as all groups converge to the strategy implied by the semantics of public signals.  
Almost common signals. Result 2 shows that sunspot-driven behavior may arise with highly 
correlated extrinsic private signals. Since this is unprecedented evidence and in strong contrast 
to the equilibrium predictions, we provide a robustness check for this result by using a different 
frame for the extrinsic information. Specifically, we run a treatment where each agent gets sig-
nal Z with probability 0.9. Note that this probability is comparable to the probability that both 
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subjects get the same signal in Treatment P95 (p = 0.905). The signal in Treatment AC (“Al-
most common signal”) generates common p-beliefs (with p = 0.9) in the sense of Monderer and 
Samet (1989), while there are no common p-beliefs in Treatment P95. Therefore, Treatment 
AC represents an alternative test of whether behavior is discontinuous in p, as predicted by 
theory. In Treatment AC, no sunspot equilibrium exists since the information is not dissemi-
nated to all subjects with probability 1.  
In Treatment AC, we see 2 out of 6 groups converging to a sunspot-driven strategy (as 
in P95), while the other groups coordinated on 50. The average distance of choices from the 
secure action was 13.86, conditional on receiving a signal, it was 14.83 which is close to the 
average distance in Treatment P95 (17.26). Including Treatment AC in our previous regression 
model indicates that the distance to 50 is significantly higher than in Treatment N irrespective 
of the time horizon (see Table C3 in Appendix C). Again, Wald tests confirm that the average 
distance to 50 in AC is significantly larger than in P75 and significantly smaller than in C.25 
This evidence supports our previous Results 2 and 3: if the probability that both subjects receive 
the same information is sufficiently large, private signals can lead to sunspot-driven behavior.  
4.4 Payoffs 
The previous results clearly show that different information structures induce very different 
behavior. As long as groups quickly converge to coordinate an equilibrium, payoffs do not 
depend on the specific equilibrium they play. However, if an information structure results in a 
slow convergence process or in convergence to a non-equilibrium strategy, we observe frequent 
miscoordination and low payoffs.  
  
                                                     
25 Further evidence comes from a Jonckheere-Terpstra test. We can reject the hypothesis that the average distance 
in Treatments P75, AC and C is the same in favor of the alternative hypothesis of P75 ≤ AC ≤ C (p < 0.01).  
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Table 4: Average Payoffs 
  Treatments without public signals  Treatments with public signals 
Treatment  N P75 P95 AC  C CP CC 
Period 1-20  197.43 188.58 180.65 185.17  190.26 180.83 187.50 
Period 61-80  199.71 199.00 193.09 193.96  199.60 195.42 197.86 
all periods  199.17 196.68 188.56 190.72  195.37 189.56 194.69 
 
Table 4 displays the average payoffs in the different treatments for the first 20 periods, for the 
last 20 periods, and for all periods. The table documents two results. First, in treatments with 
no signals (N) or imprecise private signals (P75), groups coordinated quickly on the secure 
equilibrium and achieved almost the maximum payoff of 200 points. Similarly, payoffs are 
close to the maximum in Treatments C (195.37) and CC (194.69). Second, in treatments with 
highly correlated private signals or with both public and private signals (P95, AC, and CP) 
different groups coordinated on different strategies and average payoffs were lower. Non-equi-
librium strategies that were chosen by some groups in these treatments result in miscoordination 
and payoff losses. Groups who coordinated on intermediate sunspot equilibria, such as “25/75” 
in Treatment CP, achieved lower payoffs, because the convergence process required more time 
than convergence to other equilibria. Even though the individual losses arising from strategies 
that condition actions on private signals might be small, such behavior affects the strategies of 
other players and, thus, prolongs the time that subjects need to coordinate. 
Result 5: Salient extrinsic public signals or private signals with low correlation do not 
affect payoffs from coordination. However, if private signals are highly corre-
lated or combined with public signals, we observe considerable payoff losses 
due to miscoordination. 
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For statistical support we ran nonparametric tests based on all 80 periods. This gives us a rig-
orous test of possible differences in payoffs, since it requires long periods of miscoordination 
to generate significant differences in average payoffs over the entire game. According to a 
Kruskal-Wallis test, we can reject that payoffs are the same in treatments with and without 
signals (p < 0.02). While pairwise comparisons between N and P75, C or CC are statistically 
insignificant (Mann-Whitney tests, p > 0.11, two-sided), the payoff differences between N and 
P95, AC or CP are statistically significant (Mann-Whitney tests, p < 0.03, two-sided).  
5 Conclusion  
In this paper, we provided a systematic analysis of how the occurrence of sunspot-driven be-
havior depends on the noise structure of extrinsic signals. In a simple coordination game, in-
spired by Keynes’s beauty contest and interpreted as inflation forecasts, we introduced extrinsic 
signals and varied the number and correlation of signals in order to test their effects on behavior.  
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the impact of salient extrinsic signals depends 
on the informational environment. As long as private signals with low correlation are the only 
information, subjects quickly learn to ignore them and focus on the action that minimizes stra-
tegic uncertainty. It needs at least highly correlated private signals to pull actions away from 
this secure action and generate sunspot-driven behavior. Such behavior results in lower rates of 
coordination and lower payoffs compared to situations without signals.  
Salient public signals, however, have a substantial impact on collective perceptions and 
sunspot equilibria reliably show up in an environment where subjects are neither trained nor 
recommended to follow these signals. Public signals are used as coordinating devices and their 
semantic implication replaces the role of the secure action as a focal point. Public signals do 
not significantly reduce coordination rates or payoffs.   
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In contrast, if public signals are combined with private signals, the power of public sig-
nals is reduced. Coordination rates and payoffs are lower than in environments with pure private 
or public signals. Thus, the co-existence of equally salient public and private signals is harmful 
to coordination and induces payoff losses. 
Practically, these findings may have important implications. Central bank announce-
ments made for the purpose of forward guidance can be seen as extrinsic public signals that are 
provided with the intention of moving expectations to a better equilibrium. In order to achieve 
their goal, they should be as salient as possible and leave no room for speculation about their 
meaning, for example by providing numerical inflation or interest-rate forecasts. Thereby, Del-
phic forward guidance can succeed in moving an economy from one equilibrium to another, 
even if it merely provides a focal point for expectations.  
Statements or comments (also by private agents) that oppose the central bank’s an-
nouncements can, however, diminish the intended shift of expectations. In practice, central-
bank announcements typically compete with private extrinsic signals for attention. Their power 
as focal point then presumably depends on their reliability as compared to competing private 
forecasts. Adding a public signal to an environment with already existing private signals of 
similar salience may lead to more frequent coordination failure and reduce welfare.26  
Some authors have advocated that central banks should release information with ambi-
guity in order to avoid over-reactions (e.g., Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2014). However, it is not 
clear which effects ambiguous (and thus non-salient) central-bank messages have when they 
compete with salient but less informative private and public messages from other sources. Our 
results point to the possibility that salient uninformative (extrinsic) signals may be more pow-
erful in moving markets than informative (intrinsic) but non-salient signals. 
                                                     
26 Morris and Shin (2002) made a similar argument for intrinsic signals. 
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The game form that we employed permits the use of risk dominance in the notion of 
Haruvy and Stahl (2004) for measuring the power of sunspots. Whether the power of extrinsic 
private signals may be sufficiently strong to distract actions from a payoff-dominant equilib-
rium is an open question. 
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Appendix	A:	Proofs	‐	For	Online	Publication.	
Proposition	1:	Let	 *s 	be	a	Bayesian	Nash	equilibrium	strategy	profile,	where ),(* iis  	is	
the	action	played	by	agent	i	with	public	signal		and	private	signal	 i .	In	equilibrium,	ac‐
tions	are	the	same	for	both	agents	and	do	not	depend	on	the	private	signal,	that	is,	for	any	
given	public	signal  :	 ),(),( ** jjii ss   		for	all	 ji  , .		
Proof:	We	will	prove	the	proposition	in	three	steps.	
Step	1.	We	show	that	the	equilibrium	must	be	in	pure	strategies.	For	any	given	set	of	signals,	it	
must	be	that		
 2** ),(),|(minarg),( jjijxii sxprobs
j


 

	
where	 ),|( ijprob  	 is	the	probability	that	the	other	player	receives	signal	 j 	when	agent	i	
receives	signal	 i 	and	the	public	signal	is	 .	The	expression	to	be	maximized	is	strictly	concave,	
so	the	best	response	must	be	unique.	Hence,	it	cannot	be	that	in	equilibrium	different	actions	are	
played	with	positive	probabilities	for	the	same	combination	of	signals.	
Step	2.	In	equilibrium,	the	lowest	[highest]	actions	played	for	some	given	public	signal	must	be	
the	same	for	both	players,	that	is,	
		 ),(min),(min ** jjii ss
ji
   	and	 ),(max),(max ** jjii ss ji    	for	 ji  .		
We	will	show	this	by	contradiction.	Suppose	that,	for	some	signals,	Player	i	chooses	an	action	that	
is	smaller	than	any	action	of	Player	j.	Then	Player	i	can	raise	her	payoffs	for	all	possible	realizations	
of	the	signals	by	increasing	this	action.	Hence,	the	lowest	actions	must	be	the	same	for	all	agents.	
The	same	argument	holds	for	the	highest	actions.	
Step	 3.	 Here,	 we	 show	 that	 ),(max),(min ** iiii ss
ii
   	 for	 both	 players.	 Suppose	 that	
),(max),(min ** iiii ss
ii
   .	 By	 Step	 2,	 there	 is	 a	 private	 signal	 j ,	 at	which	 Player	 j	 also	
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chooses		 ),(min),( ** iijj ss
i
  .	Here,	his	expected	payoff	is	 				
		  2** ),(),(),|( jjiiji ssprobdA
i


 

.		
If	Player	j	increases	his	lowest	action,	his	expected	payoff	rises	according	to		
    0),(),(),|(2),(),|( **
),(
2*
*



 
 

jjiiji
sx
iiji ssprobdxsprobdAx
i
jj
i


.	
Thus,	Player	j	has	an	incentive	to	raise	his	minimal	action.	The	same	argument	holds	for	the	high‐
est	action.	Thus,	whenever	one	player	chooses	different	actions	for	different	private	signals,	the	
best	reply	of	the	other	player	is	moving	to	the	center	of	the	interval	defined	by	the	most	extreme	
actions	of	the	other	player.	This,	however,	cannot	be	an	equilibrium,	because	the	extreme	actions	
of	different	players	should	be	the	same	according	to	Step	2.		
Therefore,	it	must	be	that	 ),(),( ** jjii ss   		for	all	 ji  , .		■	
Proposition	2:	  ,
2
),(*  cbs ii 	is	both	the	secure	action	and	the	risk‐dominant	equi‐
librium.	If	ቚݏ௜ሺ߮, ߰௜ሻ െ ௕ା௖ଶ ቚ ൏ ቚ̃ݏ௜ሺ߮, ߰௜ሻ െ
௕ା௖
ଶ ቚ		for	all	߮, ߰௜,	then	ݏ௜	risk	dominates	̃ݏ௜		
in	the	notion	of	Haruvy	and	Stahl	(2004).		
Proof.	The	minimum	payoff	that	a	player	might	get	if	he	chooses	action	x,	is	the	payoff	resulting	
from	 the	opponent	 choosing	either	of	 the	 extremes,	 that	 is	minሼܣ െ ݀ሺݔ െ ܾሻଶ, ܣ െ ݀ሺݔ െ ܿሻଶሽ.	
This	function	is	maximized	at	x	=	(b+c)/2,	and	therefore	playing	the	middle	action	maximizes	the	
minimum	payoff.	Hence,	the	midpoint	of	the	interval	is	the	secure	action.	
Haruvy	and	Stahl	(2004,	p.	322)	define	risk	dominance	as	follows:	“Given	a	symmetric	n	×	
n	game	with	payoff	matrix	U,	let	NE	denote	the	set	of	Nash	equilibrium	actions,	and	let	ΔNE	denote	
the	simplex	on	NE.	For	each	j	∈	NE,	define	 RDjq 	as	the	relative	proportion	of	ΔNE	for	which	action	j	
is	the	best	response	to	some	belief	in	ΔNE.	Then	the	action	k	∈	NE	that	maximizes	Uk	qRD	(where	Uk	
is	the	kth	row	of	the	payoff	matrix)	is	the	risk‐dominant	NE	action.”	
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In	our	game,	NE	is	the	interval	[b,c].	Due	to	the	quadratic	loss	function,	the	relative	pro‐
portion	of	ΔNE	for	which	an	action	is	a	best	response	is	larger,	the	closer	the	action	is	to	the	mid‐
point	of	the	action	space	(b+c)/2.	These	proportions	define	 RDjq 	in	our	game.	This	distribution	is	
symmetric	and	has	a	unique	maximum	at	(b+c)/2.	Thus,	the	best	response	to	this	distribution	is	
the	midpoint	itself.	Comparing	any	subset	of	actions,	the	one	with	the	smallest	deviation	from	the	
midpoint	yields	the	highest	expected	payoff	and,	thus,	risk	dominates	the	others.	■	
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Appendix	B:	Symmetry	of	Actions	‐	For	Online	Publication	
Here,	we	analyze	whether	actions	played	during	the	experiment	are	symmetric,	that	is	whether	a	
subject	choosing	ܽ௜ ൌ ݉	when	she	receives	signal	ݏ	 ൌ 	0	also	chooses	ܽ௜ ൌ 100 െ ݉	when	receiv‐
ing	signal	ݏ	 ൌ 	100.	Symmetry	allows	us	to	measure	the	power	of	sunspots	by	the	distance	of	cho‐
sen	actions	from	50,	independent	of	whether	signals	are	0	or	100.		
Note	that	for	treatments	with	two	signals,	symmetry	refers	to	playing	m	when	both	signals	
are	0	and	100 െ ݉	when	both	signals	are	100.	When	the	two	signals	are	different	in	CP,	symmetry	
means	playing	n	when	the	public	signal	is	0	and	the	private	signal	is	100,	and	100 െ ݊	when	the	
public	signal	is	100	and	the	private	signal	is	0.	For	two	distinct	public	signals	in	Treatment	CC,	
symmetry	prescribes	playing	50	as	in	situations	without	signals.	To	test	the	symmetry	of	strate‐
gies	we	estimate	the	following	model:	
ܽ௜௧ ൌ ߚଵܵ100 ൅ ߚଶP݁ݎ݅݋݀ ൅ ߙ௜൅ݑ௜௧	
	
Table	B1:	Symmetry	of	Decisions	
	 Dependent	variable:	 ita 	
	 P75	 P95	 C CP CC	 AC
	 	 	 	 Y=Xi	 Y≠Xi	 Y=X	 Y≠X	 	
Signal=100	
(D)	 0.113	 ‐1.086	 ‐0.212	 ‐0.280	 ‐1.878**	 0.019	 ‐0.443	 0.962**	
	 (0.517)	 (1.099)	 (0.511)	 (0.449)	 (0.939)	 (0.485) (0.447)	 (0.471)	
Period	 0.110***	 0.058*	 ‐0.118** 0.043	 ‐0.198***	 ‐0.039	 0.018***	 0.043	
	 (0.034)	 (0.034)	 (0.055)	 (0.038)	 (0.062)	 (0.029) (0.006)	 (0.048)	
Constant	 43.321***	 31.245***	 8.726*	 13.675*** 34.617*** 3.662*	 49.403***	 33.916***
	 (1.866)	 (6.446)	 (4.780)	 (2.789)	 (3.916)	 (2.004) (0.463)	 (7.617)	
chi²	 10.95	 3.93	 6.40	 2.86	 10.37	 2.85	 11.00	 11.58	
R²	 0.07	 0.006	 0.043	 0.003	 0.044	 0.005	 0.002	 0.003	
N	 2880	 2880	 2880	 3456	 2304	 1728	 1152	 2662	
Notes:	*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01	
Random‐effects	GLS	regression	with	robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	group	level	in	parentheses.	(D)	
denotes	dummy	variable,	equal	signal	refers	to	(Xi	=	Y)	or	(Y1	=	Y2)	and	unequal	signals	to	(Xi	≠	Y)	or	(Y1	≠	
Y2).	Treatment	AC	only	includes	observations	where	the	random	number	Z	was	revealed	to	subjects.	For	
CC,	the	constant	is	not	significantly	different	from	50	(p=0.20).			
	
The	dependent	variable	is	the	decision	of	individual	i.	We	transform	this	variable	to	ܽ௜ ൌ
100 െ ݉	when	the	private	signal	is	ݏ	 ൌ 	100	(as	in	P75,	P95,	and	AC),	when	the	public	signal	is	
ݏ	 ൌ 	100	(as	in	C	and	CP),	or	when	the	public	signal	 ଵܻ	is	ݏ	 ൌ 	100	(as	in	CC).	Thus	the	dependent	
variable	ܽ௜௧	always	measures	the	distance	to	zero	irrespective	of	the	signal	realization.	As	inde‐
pendent	variables	we	include	“Period”	to	control	for	the	time	trend	and	a	dummy	variable,	“S100”,	
which	equals	1	if	the	private	signal	equals	100	(in	P75,	P95,	or	AC)	or	the	public	signal	equals	100	
(in	C,	CP,	or	Y1	 in	CC).	For	Treatment	AC,	we	consider	only	observations	 in	which	 the	random	
number	Z	was	revealed	to	the	subjects.	For	Treatments	CP	and	CC	we	estimate	separate	regres‐
sions	for	equal	signals	 ௜ܺ ൌ ܻ	or	 ଵܻ ൌ ଶܻ		and	unequal	signals ௜ܺ ് ܻ	or	 ଵܻ ് ଶܻ.	For	Treatment	CC,	
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we	also	 test	whether	 the	constant	equals	50,	which	amounts	 to	both	public	signals	having	 the	
same	impact	on	behavior.	
The	regression	results	are	displayed	in	Table	B1.	We	only	report	the	results	of	a	random	
effects	model	as	specified	above	in	which	we	control	for	repeated	decisions	of	the	same	subject	as	
well	as	for	dependencies	within	matching	groups.	Alternatively,	we	used	a	simple	OLS	model	with	
clustering	at	 the	group	 level,	which	does	not	 impose	any	 restriction	on	 the	 correlation	within	
groups.	Our	variable	of	interest	is	the	dummy	for	the	signal	“S100”.	If	decisions	are	symmetric,	the	
coefficient	ߚ௜	should	be	close	to	zero	and	insignificant.	Indeed	we	observe	for	treatments	P75,	P95,	
C	and	CC	that	the	coefficient	for	“S100”	is	not	significantly	different	from	zero.	The	same	is	true	
for	treatment	CP	when	the	signals	are	equal.	In	CP	with	unequal	signals	and	in	AC	we	find	that	
“S100”	is	significant	at	the	5‐percent‐level,	but	numerically	small.	This	is	mainly	due	to	one	match‐
ing	group	in	each	of	the	two	treatments.	If	we	exclude	these	two	groups	the	coefficient	for	“S100”	
is	insignificant	in	both	regressions.	The	OLS	regressions	with	clustering	at	the	group	level	yield	
insignificant	coefficients	in	all	treatments	(including	all	groups).		
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Appendix	C.	Additional	Tables	‐	For	Online	Publication	
	
Table	C1:	Aggregate	Results	of	Non‐sunspot	Treatments	
Treatment	 Session	 Group	 Strategy	 T6	 T4	 Avg.	coord.	rate	
Avg.	payoff	(std.	
dev.)	
|ܽ௜ െ 50|		
(std.	dev.)	
N	
1	
1	 50	 56	 14	 0.84	 198.5	(6.8)	
1.44	
(5.9)	
N	 2	 50	 42	 1	 0.96	 199.3	(5.2)	
0.55	
(4.2)	
N	
2	
3	 50	 6	 2	 0.98	 199.6	(3.82)	
0.25	
(3.01)	
N	 4	 50	 29	 19	 0.81	 198.4	(8.29)	
1.83	
(6.15)	
N	
3	
5	 50	 	 1	 0.98	 199.6	(4.55)	
0.26	
(3.24)	
N	 6	 50	 7	 4	 0.95	 199.7	(2.24)	
0.55	
(2.69)	
P75	
4	
7	 50	 10	 7	 0.93	 198.9	(5.5)	
1.27	
(6.4)	
P75	 8	 50	 20	 2	 0.89	 197.1	(11.4)	
2.08	
(8.6)	
P75	 9	 50	 ‐	 25	 0.58	 195.1	(9.9)	
4.88	
(10.5)	
P75	
5	
10	 50	 18	 11	 0.88	 195.2	(20.09)	
3.30	
(11.16)	
P75	 11	 50	 66	 14	 0.88	 193.95	(19.78)	
3.33	
(12.27)	
P75	 12	 50	 29	 2	 0.96	 199.8	(1.87)	
0.20	
(1.97)	
P95	
6	
13	 10/90	 ‐	 67	 0.51	 185.5	(39.4)	
39.39	
(6.5)	
P95	 14	 10/90	 ‐	 63	 0.30	 181.6	(38.7)	
38.60	
(12.6)	
P95	 15	 50	 13	 10	 0.90	 195.8	(19.3)	
2.37	
(9.7)	
P95	
7	
16	 50	 7	 3	 0.96	 199.2	(5.1)	
0.66	
(4.5)	
P95	 17	 50	 12	 7	 0.92	 196.5	(12.3)	
2.44	
(10.5)	
P95	 18	 50	 ‐	 80	 0.31	 172.7	(33.5)	
20.07	
(22.4)	
AC	
8	
19	 50	 32	 2	 0.96	 198.5	(8.5)	
0.79	
(6.1)	
AC	 20	 50	 7	 2	 0.96	 198.3	(9.0)	
1.04	
(7.1)	
AC	 21	 50	 16	 1	 0.97	 199.5	(4.0)	
0.38	
(3.5)	
AC	
9	
22	 0/100	 70	 1	 0.80	 188.9	(27.4)	
44.94	
(14.8)	
AC	 23	 50	 19	 7	 0.90	 195.5	(14.1)	
3.71	
(12.9)	
AC	 24	 0/100	 ‐	 70	 0.25	 163.6	(48.7)	
32.31	
(21.8)	
Notes:	T4	denotes	the	earliest	period	from	which	at	least	4	subjects	play	the	same	strategy	until	the	last	but	one	
period,	allowing	a	deviation	of	±3.	T6	denotes	the	earliest	period	from	which	all	6	subjects	play	the	same	strategy	
until	the	last	but	one	period,	allowing	a	deviation	of	±1.	The	avg.	coordination	rate	is	the	percentage	of	pairs	choos‐
ing	the	same	action	within	a	range	of	±1	over	all	periods.	
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Table	C2:	Aggregate	Results	of	Sunspots	Treatments	
Treatment	 Session	 Group	 Strategy	 T6	 T4	 Avg.	coord.	rate	 Avg.	payoff		(std.	dev.)	
|ܽ௜ െ 50|			
(std.	dev.)	
C	
10	
25	 0/100	 80	 10	 0.74	 196.3	(20.0)	
48.31	
(5.8)	
C	 26	 0/100	 6	 3	 0.97	 199.9	(1.01)	
49.60	
(2.38)	
C	 27	 0/100	 33	 6	 0.93	 197.8	(15.8)	
48.76	
(6.0)	
C	
11	
28	 0/100	 2	 1	 0.99	 199.8	(3.2)	
49.88	
(2.3)	
C	 29	 0/100	 80	 55	 0.44	 182.6	(25.3)	
33.99	
(21.2)	
C	 30	 0/100	 49	 3	 0.94	 196.0	(26.1)	
49.53	
(2.8)	
CP	
12	
31	 25/75	 65	 59	 0.36	 193.3	(11.4)	
26.00	
(11.8)	
CP	 32	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.15	 179.9	(32.7)	
33.83	
(17.8)	
CP	 33	 50	 24	 8	 0.90	 194.9	(15.0)	
3.49	
(12.7)	
CP	
13	
34	 0/100	 54	 28	 0.72	 192.2	(23.1)	
45.49	
(12.2)	
CP	 35	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.40	 185.3	(19.3)	
16.19	
(19.0)	
CP	 36	 25/75	 ‐	 55	 0.41	 187.3	(16.9)	
19.09	
(17.3)	
CP	
14	
37	 0/100	 33	 1	 0.99	 199.0	(13.3)	
49.90	
(2.3)	
CP	 38	 0/100	 65	 29	 0.72	 189.8	(29.6)	
45.19	
(13.0)	
CP	 39	 25/75	 ‐	 76	 0.34	 184.9	(25.0)	
25.58	
(13.6)	
CP	
15	
40	 0/100	 77	 22	 0.63	 186.0	(29.4)	
41.98	
(16.2)	
CP	 41	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.10	 188.1	(14.5)	
25.09	
(16.6)	
CP	 42	 0/100	 56	 9	 0.84	 194.1	(21.8)	
46.95	
(10.8)	
CC	
16	
43	 Mean	 79	 16	 0.83	 195.3	(14.3)	
33.32	
(23.0)	
CC	 44	 Mean	 ‐	 3	 0.66	 184.6	(35.4)	
28.65	
(23.5)	
CC	 45	 Mean	 20	 12	 0.91	 190.3	(38.5)	
30.88	
(24.2)	
CC	
17	
46	 Mean	 58	 4	 0.96	 198.5	(14.0)	
30.08	
(24.4)	
CC	 47	 Mean	 4	 1	 0.99	 199.6	(4.6)	
30.00	
(24.5)	
CC	 48	 Mean	 2	 1	 0.99	 199.9	(1.2)	
30.06	
(24.5)	
Notes:	T4	denotes	the	earliest	period	from	which	at	 least	4	subjects	play	the	same	strategy	until	 the	 last	but	one	
period,	allowing	a	deviation	of	±3.	T6	denotes	the	earliest	period	from	which	all	6	subjects	play	the	same	strategy	
until	the	last	but	one	period,	allowing	a	deviation	of	±1.	The	avg.	coordination	rate	is	the	percentage	of	pairs	choosing	
the	same	action	within	a	range	of	±1	over	all	periods.	
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Table	C3:	Panel	Regression	
dependent	variable:	 distance	to	50	
		 period	1‐10	 period	11‐80	 all	periods	
P75	 9.306***	 0.612	 1.698**	
 (3.308)	 (0.562)	 (0.684)	AC	 16.870**	 13.670*	 14.070*	
 (7.154)	 (8.220)	 (8.018)	P95	 20.694***	 15.835**	 16.443**	
 (5.067)	 (7.327)	 (6.963)	C	 38.894***	 46.875***	 45.877***	
 (3.375)	 (2.309)	 (2.393)	Constant	 3.792***	 0.388***	 0.814***	
		 (1.370)	 (0.142)	 (0.250)	
Tests#:	   P75=AC	 0.161	 0.056	 0.062	
P75=P95	 0.047	 0.037	 0.035	
AC=C	 0.006	 0.000	 0.000	
N	 1774	 12408	 14182	
R²	 0.33	 0.59	 0.55	
Notes:	*	p<0.1,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01.		
Random‐effects	panel	regressions	with	standard	errors	clustered	at	the	matching	group	level.	The	de‐
pendent	variable	in	Column	1‐3	is	the	distance	of	a	choice	to	50.	
#	Tests:	The	p‐values	correspond	to	Wald	tests	(one‐sided)	based	on	the	regression	results	and	are	ad‐
justed	for	multiple	testing	using	Holm’s	method.		
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Appendix	D:	Detailed	Procedures	‐	For	Online	Publication	
Procedures:	The	general	procedure	was	the	same	in	each	session	and	treatment.	At	the	beginning	
of	a	session,	the	subjects	were	seated	at	computer	stations	in	random	order.	The	instructions	were	
distributed	and	read	out	aloud,	and	if	a	player	had	any	questions,	these	were	answered	in	private.	
Throughout	the	sessions,	the	subjects	were	not	allowed	to	communicate	with	one	another	and	
could	not	see	each	other’s	screens.	They	were	not	informed	about	the	identity	of	their	partner	or	
the	other	members	of	their	matching	group.	In	the	instructions,	the	payoff	function	(2)	was	ex‐
plained	in	detail	and	was	also	displayed	as	a	mathematical	function	and	as	a	non‐exhaustive	payoff	
table. Additionally, subjects could use a calculator during the experiment, which allowed them to enter 
hypothetical numbers for their own and their partner’s decision and calculate the resulting payoff. Be‐
fore	starting	the	experiment,	subjects	had	to	answer	questions	about	the	game’s	procedures	and	
in	particular	how	the	payoffs	were	determined.	We	had	three	reasons	for	implementing	this	quiz.	
First,	we	wanted	 to	make	sure	 that	 the	subjects	understood	how	 their	payoff	would	be	deter‐
mined.	Second,	we	wanted	to	alert	the	subjects	to	the	fact	that	neither	the	number	Z	nor	the	signals	
would	affect	their	payoff,	and	third,	the	quiz	also	ensured	that	the	subjects	could	clarify	any	last‐
minute	questions	and	gain	confidence	that	the	other	players	understood	the	game.	For instance, in 
Treatments P75 and P95, the relevant statement was: “Your payoff in a period depends on a) the number 
Z, b) the distance between your chosen number and the number chosen by your partner, or c) your 
private hint X.” Subjects had to indicate the right statement and if their answer was not correct, the 
experimenter once again explained the payoff function to make clear that it only depends on the distance 
between one’s chosen number and the number chosen by the partner. The full set of questions can be 
found in Appendix E. Once	 all	 subjects	 had	 answered	 the	 questions	 correctly,	 the	 experiment	
started.		
We	ran	a	total	of	17	sessions	with	18	subjects	in	each	session,	except	for	three	sessions	of	Treat‐
ment	N	that	had	only	12	subjects.	The	sessions	took	place	between	July	2008	and	December	2009	
at	the	Technical	University	Berlin.	We ran two sessions for N and one session for P75 in February 
2012 to have six independent observations for both treatments. In	total	288	students,	mainly	under‐
graduate	majors	from	various	fields	(engineering,	business	administration,	mathematics,	chemis‐
try,	 etc.)	 participated.	 They	 were	 recruited	 through	 the	 online	 recruitment	 system	 ORSEE	
(Greiner,	2015).	The	experiments	were	computerized	using	z‐tree	(Fischbacher,	2007).	At	the	end	
of	a	session,	we	determined	the	subjects’	earnings	by	randomly	selecting	10	out	of	the	80	periods	
for	payment.	This	was	done	to	have	sufficient	incentives	for	adjusting	strategies	and	still	avoiding	
the	relevance	of	risk	aversion.	The	subjects	were	then	paid	in	private,	where	the	points	earned	in	
the	selected	periods	were	converted	to	euros	(1	point	=	1	euro	cent).	In	addition	subjects	received	
a	fee	of	3	euros	for	showing	up.	A	session	lasted	about	one	hour	and	the	subjects	on	average	earned	
21	euros.	
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Appendix	E:	Sample	Instructions	for	Treatment	CP	‐	For	Online	Publica‐
tion	
The	experiment	in	which	you	are	participating	is	part	of	a	research	project.	Its	aim	is	to	analyze	
economic	decision	behavior.	
The	experiment	consists	of	80	periods	 in	 total.	The	rules	and	 instructions	are	 the	same	 for	all	
participants.	In	each	period,	you	have	to	make	a	decision.	All	periods	are	completely	independent.	
Your	income	from	the	experiment	depends	on	your	decisions	and	the	decisions	made	by	the	other	
participants.	Please	read	all	instructions	carefully	and	thoroughly.	
Please	note	that	you	are	not	permitted	to	speak	to	the	other	participants	or	to	exchange	
information	with	them	for	the	duration	of	the	entire	experiment.	Should	you	have	a	ques‐
tion,	please	raise	your	hand,	and	we	will	come	to	you	and	answer	your	question.	Please	do	
not	ask	your	question(s)	in	a	loud	voice.	Should	you	breach	these	rules,	we	will	be	forced	
to	exclude	you	from	the	experiment.	
At	the	end	of	the	experiment,	the	computer	will	randomly	draw	10	of	the	80	periods,	which	will	
become	relevant	for	your	payoff.	Your	payoff	will	then	be	determined	according	to	the	sum	of	your	
earnings	from	these	selected	periods.	In	addition,	you	will	receive	3	Euro	for	participating	in	the	
experiment.	
	
Description	of	the	Experiment	
	
At	the	beginning	of	the	experiment,	three	groups	of	six	participants	each	are	randomly	and	anon‐
ymously	formed.	These	groups	remain	unaltered	for	the	entire	experiment.	At	no	point	are	you	
told	who	is	in	your	group.	
In	each	period,	you	are	randomly	and	anonymously	paired	with	another	participant	from	
your	group	(referred	to	as	your	partner	from	now	on).	This	means	that	you	can	be	paired	with	
the	same	participant	from	your	group	several	times	in	the	course	of	the	experiment,	albeit	not	in	
two	successive	periods.	Neither	you	nor	your	partner	is	told	the	other’s	identity.	
	
1.	Information	at	the	Beginning	of	Each	Period	
	
At	 the	beginning	of	 each	period,	 the	 computer	 randomly	draws	a	number	Z.	 The	number	Z	 is	
equally	likely	either	to	have	the	value	0	or	100.	This	means	that	in	5	out	of	10	cases,	on	average,	
the	number	Z	takes	the	value	0,	and	in	5	out	of	10	cases,	it	takes	the	value	100.	The	number	Z	is	
the	same	for	you	and	your	partner.		
At	the	time	of	the	decision,	the	number	Z	is	not	known.	Instead,	you	receive	two	independent	hints	
for	the	number	Z:	
Shared	hint	Y:	
You	and	your	partner	both	receive	a	shared	hint	Y	for	the	number	Z.	This	hint	can	be	either	0	or	
100	and	is	randomly	determined.	With	a	probability	of	75	percent,	hint	Y	has	the	same	value	as	
the	number	Z.	With	the	remaining	probability	of	25	percent,	the	hint	will	have	the	other	value.	The	
shared	hint	is	the	same	for	both	of	you.	
Private	hint	X:	
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In	addition	to	the	shared	hint	Y,	you	will	receive	a	private	hint	X	for	the	number	Z.	Your	partner	
also	receives	a	private	hint	X.		
The	private	hint	can	be	either	0	or	100	and	is	randomly	determined.	With	a	probability	of	75	per‐
cent,	the	private	hint	X	has	the	same	value	as	the	number	Z.	With	the	remaining	probability	of	25	
percent,	the	private	hint	X	will	have	the	other	value.		
Your	private	hint	and	the	private	hint	of	your	partner	are	independently	drawn,	i.e.,	both	private	
hints	can	be	different.	You	are	not	told	which	private	hint	your	partner	has	received,	and	your	
partner	is	not	told	which	private	hint	you	have	received.	
If	the	shared	and	the	private	hint	are	the	same,	the	probability	of	both	being	correct	is	90	percent.	
In	other	words,	if	you	have	received	two	similar	hints,	then	in	9	out	of	10	cases	these	correspond	
to	the	number	Z.		
If	the	shared	and	the	private	hint	are	different,	then	both	values	of	the	number	Z	are	equally	prob‐
able.		
	
2.	Your	Decision		
	
In	each	period,	you	have	to	decide	on	a	number	between	0	and	100	(incl.	0	and	100).	Once	you	
have	made	your	decision,	 you	have	 to	 click	on	 the	OK	button	on	 the	 corresponding	 computer	
screen.	Once	all	participants	have	made	their	binding	decisions,	a	period	is	finished.	
	
3.	Your	Earnings	
	
Your	earnings	depend	on	how	close	your	decision	has	come	to	your	partner’s	decision.	
Your	earnings	(in	Euro	cents)	=	  2   
100
2200 decisionpartner'sYourdecisionYour  .	
In	other	words:	your	earnings	in	each	period	are	200	Euro	cents	at	the	most.	These	200	Euro	cents	
are	reduced	by	the	distance	between	your	decision	and	your	partner’s	decision.	
The	distance	is	squared,	so	that	higher	distance	leads	to	a	disproportionate	loss	compared	to	a	
smaller	distance.	The	closer	your	decision	is	to	your	partner’s	decision,	the	higher	your	earnings	
are.		
The	 following	table	gives	you	an	overview	of	possible	earnings.	 In	 this	 table,	only	distances	 in	
steps	of	20	are	shown.	Please	note	that	distances	may	be	any	integer	between	0	and	100.	In	the	
table,	you	can	also	see	that	you	are	able	to	earn	a	maximum	of	200	Euro	cents	(top‐left	field)	and	
a	minimum	of	0	Euro	cents	(bottom‐right	field).	
	 Earnings
Dis
tan
ce	
fro
m	
yo
ur	
pa
rt‐
ne
r’s
	de
cis
ion
	
0 200
20 192
40 168
60 128
80 72
100 0
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Calculator	
	
You	have	a	calculator	at	your	disposal	in	each	period.	In	order	to	use	the	calculator,	you	can	note	
your	own	decision	and	test	as	many	of	your	partner’s	decisions	as	you	wish.	The	calculator	then	
calculates	your	earnings	for	the	relevant	data	entered.	In	the	first	5	periods,	the	calculator	is	active	
for	20	seconds.	During	this	time,	you	may	carry	out	as	many	calculations	as	you	wish.	After	that,	
the	calculator	becomes	inactive	and	you	must	make	your	decision.	From	the	6th	period	onwards,	
the	calculator	is	only	active	for	10	seconds	and	you	can	make	your	decision	at	once.	
	
	
Information	at	the	End	of	a	Period	
	
At	the	end	of	a	period,	you	are	given	the	following	information:	
	
 The	number	Z		
 The	shared	hint	Y	
 Your	private	hint	X	
	
 Your	decision	
 Your	partner’s	decision	
 The	discrepancy	between	your	decision	and	
your	partner’s	decision		
 Your	earnings	
	
	
Control	Questions	
	
1. Is	everyone	given	the	same	hint	X?		 	
‐	Yes,	everyone	is	given	the	same	hint	X	/		
- No,	everyone	receives	his	own	hint,	i.e.,	your	hint	X	can	be	different	from	your	partner’s	
hint	X.	
2. Is	everyone	given	the	same	hint	Y?	
‐	Yes,	everyone	is	given	the	same	hint	Y	
- No,	everyone	receives	his	own	hint	Y,	i.e.,	your	hint	Y	can	be	different	from	your	partner’s	
hint	Y.	
3. Your	earnings	in	a	period	depend	on	...			
…the	distance	between	your	chosen	number	and	your	partner’s	chosen	number		
…the	number	Z	
…the	private	hint	X	
4. Are	you	always	paired	with	the	same	partner?	 	 Yes	/	No	
5. How	many	of	the	80	periods	are	randomly	chosen	by	the	computer	in	order	to	determine	
your	earnings?		
	
